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zollern candidature and the causes of the Franco-Prussian war, for so far as new evidence is concerned he might as well have written just after the war what he has written to-day. He shows no familiarity with Sorel's *Histoire Diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande* or with *Aus dem Leben Königs Karl von Rumänien*, the former of which suggests while the latter proves that Bismarck saw in the Spanish candidature a pretext for war, which he was determined to use at the first opportunity ; and this is the more strange in that Sir Charles Dilke made all the facts known to English readers in the first number of *Cosmopolis* several years ago. Though Mr. Forbes quotes Lebrun's memoirs he does not see their importance as disclosing the chief reason why Bismarck wanted war in 1870 ; that is, to forestall any attempt of France to ally with Austria and Italy and to engage in war with Prussia in 1871.

These points are sufficient to indicate that while Mr. Forbes has written a readable life of Napoleon III. he has not presented an adequate or reliable study of the character of Napoleon's reign, the nature of his diplomacy, or the causes of his downfall.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

The Spanish Revolution, 1868-1875. By EDWARD HENRY STROBEL, late Secretary of the U. S. Legation and Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid. (Boston : Small, Maynard and Company. 1898. Pp. 293.)

THIS interesting little book is modestly described by the author as a sketch of an episode in modern Spanish history. In reality, it is a clear and comprehensive parliamentary history of the six turbulent years which began with the expulsion of Isabella II. and ended with the restoration of Alphonso XII. It deals therefore with the interregnum during which Prim was master, with the well-intentioned attempt of Amadeus, with the several experiments in the founding of a republic, and with the reaction that led through a dictatorship to the recall of the Bourbons.

The book has two principal defects. It fails to give any account either of the causes which influenced the kind of public opinion that prevails in Spain, or of the popular movements that determine in the long run the fate of all political schemes. And it plunges into the middle of events without adequate explanation of existing conditions. It assumes, in both particulars, the same knowledge in the reader as in the author concerning the antecedent history of Spain, and the habits, tastes, temper and political traditions of the Spanish people. These defects are however inherent in the author's plan of publishing separately, and as a detached account of one historical episode, matter which was originally written as part of a larger work.

On the other hand, the book has many merits. Its literary qualities are conspicuous. It is written in a strong and lucid style, which is never dull and becomes at times delightfully epigrammatic. The narrative is compact and continuous, and almost epic in its development. And al-

though there is no direct attempt at portrait-painting, there are some singularly acute estimates of the more conspicuous personages.

The most commanding figure is of course Prim,—the masterful leader of his time, “a Cromwell without convictions,” the one man in all Spain who knew when to keep silent, the one man who might have changed the course of events. Next to Prim, the chief actor is Castelar. His honesty of purpose and his readiness to own himself wrong when he saw where his theories were leading, are fully recognized; and some capital translations of portions of his speeches serve as examples of his prodigiously effective oratory. Of Serrano, there is a striking picture. He is depicted during the last year before the Restoration, face to face with the problems of the Carlist war, and vacillating perpetually,—now warmed by the hope of popularity through a military success, now chilled by the dread that if the war were ended, the army, unemployed, would pronounce for Alphonso.

But the chief value of the book lies in its accounts of the procedure of the Cortes, the mode of forming committees, and the generous opportunities afforded for unlimited and unfailing oratory; and in its clear presentation of Spanish methods in the working of representative government. Not that the author’s aim is didactic; but he deals with a period of constant change in which national idiosyncracies found frequent occasions for display, and he has effectively grouped the facts so as to throw a vivid light on the peculiar difficulties that lie in the way of a government of the people and by the people of Spain.

Of these difficulties, the most subtle and persistent is the inability of Spanish politicians to unite in steadfast parties for the purpose of accomplishing well defined and openly avowed objects. In greater or less degree this curious failure to attain the true essential of all parliamentary government is common to non-English-speaking races, although in Spain the lack of coherence and party discipline is perhaps most apparent. During the period from 1868 to 1875, when events were marching swiftly, the shifting of parliamentary groups was incessant. The two dynastic parties—the Carlists and the Alphonsists—having deep roots in the past, were more or less permanent. The other groups, usually four or five in number, had none of the characteristics of healthy growth. They were thrown together with the suddenness and definiteness of the patterns in a kaleidoscope, and the component particles were scattered and rearranged in the same instantaneous and surprising way. Such a scene as that of the famous debate of St. Joseph’s night—of which Mr. Hay has given a stirring picture in his *Castilian Days*—when Topete dramatically left the government of Prim in the face of the whole shouting Cortes—is characteristic. Even more picturesque were the events which terminated the presidency of Figueras. Early on a Saturday morning he received a vote of confidence and thanks and was declared to have deserved well of the country; in the afternoon of the same day there was a crisis over a financial measure; and on Wednesday the President had fled to France.

Spanish politicians have also signally failed to comprehend that the

whole structure of representative government necessarily rests on the belief of the people that they are in fact represented. In other words, no form of popular government can long endure unless the dominant part of the community is, on the whole, satisfied with the method of conducting the elections. That such is not the case in Spain, and that the popular distrust in this regard is one of the permanent causes of the instability of its governments, abundantly appears from the work under review. At the first election after the expulsion of Isabella, in January 1869, there was indeed an effort to secure a genuine expression of the public will; but thereafter the temptation to manufacture good majorities in the Cortes became too strong to be resisted. The well-tried method of putting up official candidates backed by unconcealed intimidation, was again applied at every election. "In a genuine parliamentary government," says our author, "it is the function of the people to decide who is to be the government; in Spain, the converse of this is true, and the government decides what is to be the result of the elections." As the result of this inability of minorities to secure just representation, we find as an established weapon of party warfare the *retraimiento*, or withdrawal of a group from the Cortes and abstention of its voters from the polls—which action almost invariably means conspiracy, followed by an appeal to arms.

Another notorious feature of Spanish politics, of which there are no less than three examples in the short period covered by this book, is the part played in every successful revolution by the military forces. The revolt of the fleet under Topete in September, 1868, the *coup d'état* of Pavia in January, 1874, and the final mutiny under Jovellar and Martinez Campos, were the events that really marked the progress of the Revolution. The incident of the abdication of Amadeus was also ultimately brought about by the refusal of the artillery officers to serve under an unpopular general. Pavia was thought to be not quite sane because he did not proclaim himself dictator after his successful *coup d'état*. Of another general, Professor Strobel says that "he has to-day in Spain one distinction almost impossible to find among officers of equal rank and prominence. During a long and brilliant career he has never taken part in any *pronunciamiento* or military insurrection of any kind."

The causes of these peculiarities in the politics of the Spanish nation are no doubt infinitely complex, but it is to be regretted that Professor Strobel, while relating the events above referred to, has made no attempt to throw light on phenomena so singular and so full of warning. His book is, and professes to be, only a fragment. At the same time, it is so good that it is to be hoped the author will be encouraged to carry out his original purpose and give us the larger work which he has had in mind. An authoritative history of Spain in the English language, beginning with the accession of Charles IV.—almost at the moment of the outbreak of the French Revolution, when the extent of the Spanish colonial empire was at its maximum—and tracing the course of events down to the present day, would be of the greatest interest. And as the growth

of the United States has been so intimately connected with the decay of the Spanish empire, such a work would be of peculiar value to American students.

It only remains to be said that the present book is handsomely printed, that it contains some annoying instances of careless proof-reading, that it has an inadequate map of Spain, and—worst of all—that it is unprovided with an index.

G. L. RIVES.

Industrial Experiments in the British Colonies of North America.

By ELEANOR LOUISA LORD. [Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Extra Volume XVII.] (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1898. Pp. viii, 154.)

THIS volume contains a somewhat detailed study of one phase of the British commercial system in the eighteenth century, viz., the policy which that government followed for the purpose of procuring from the colonies a supply of naval stores. Attention is mainly directed to the New England colonies, as they were the chief source of supply of that kind. Occasional reference, however, is made to the production of stores in the Carolinas and Pennsylvania, while an account is given of the experiment with the Palatines in New York. The concluding chapter deals summarily with a cognate subject, the rise of manufactures in the plantations. In appendices two price-lists of naval stores, principally tar, pitch, hemp and masts, are given.

In the first part of her dissertation Miss Lord traces the growth of interest among British merchants and officials in the plantations considered as a source of naval supplies. Should she ever make her treatment of this subject more exhaustive, she will find that the writings of Capt. John Smith, those of Strachey, and the manifestoes and relations which proceeded from the London Company contain not a few passages which show that they were alive to the prospective wealth of the colonies in naval stores. Perhaps the earliest references to the resources of New England in this direction are in Smith's *Description of New England* and his *New England's Trials*. Puritanism obscured this feature of colonization in New England and tobacco had a similar effect in Virginia. But as we approach the close of the seventeenth century it comes again into prominence and holds a leading place during the century which follows. Miss Lord's account of the persistent efforts of Sir Matthew Dudley and his associates to procure from the crown a charter incorporating them as a company for the production of naval stores is interesting and important. In that chapter she has fully and satisfactorily explained an episode respecting which a brief reference in a note of Palfrey contained about all the information that was previously accessible. Of the experiments with contract emigrant labor, that with the Palatines in New York had already been pretty fully investigated, and the most important documents respecting it have long been accessible ;